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ABSTRACT
There is much debate about the usefulness of the neoclassical growth model for assessing the macroeconomic
impact of ﬁscal shocks. We test the theory using data from World War II, which is by far the largest ﬁscal
shock in the history of the United States. We take observed changes in ﬁscal policy during the war as inputs
into a parameterized, dynamic general equilibrium model and compare the values of all variables in the
model to the actual values of these variables in the data. Our main ﬁnding is that the theory quantitatively
accounts for macroeconomic activity during this big ﬁscal shock.
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System.1. Introduction
World War II is the largest ﬁscal shock in the history of the United States, and it also rep-
resents the most signiﬁcant economic boom in U.S. history. Many economists agree that wartime
government spending contributed to this economic boom. But beyond this general level of agree-
ment, there is signiﬁcant debate about the impact of World War II—and more generically the
impact of other large ﬁscal changes—on the economy. A major point of disagreement is the ap-
propriate theoretical framework for quantitatively studying the impact of World War II on the
economy. Some economists argue that the standard neoclassical growth model is a useful tool for
accounting for World War II, while others argue that accounting for the impact of such large ﬁscal
changes requires major departures from the neoclassical framework.1
The disagreement about the usefulness of the neoclassical model for understanding World
War II partially reﬂects the fact that there is no comprehensive analysis of the impact of the World
War II shock on the U.S. economy using the neoclassical model. Consequently, there are several
open questions: What are the neoclassical model’s successes and failures in accounting for the
World War II economy? What are the impacts of the other large World War II changes, such as
the very large changes in tax rates, in government investment, and in the draft? World War II is the
biggest macroeconomic shock to hit the U.S. economy and therefore provides a unique opportunity
to test the neoclassical model.
We address these questions using a neoclassical growth model tailored to study World War II
by including four types of exogenous variables that were important during the war: (1) government
spending, (2) income taxes, (3) the draft, and (4) productivity shocks. We conduct a sequence of
quantitative experiments that investigate how well the model accounts for the major macroeconomic
variables: output and its components, hours worked, and factor returns during World War II.
We ﬁnd that real GNP, investment, consumption, labor supply, and the returns to capital
and labor from the model are similar to those in the data; the model captures the large increase in
real output and hours worked, the large decline in investment, and the wartime changes in factor
prices. Regarding the relative importance of the diﬀerent wartime factors, we ﬁnd that the most
important change by far is the large increase in government spending, followed by productivity.
The very large changes in the draft, and in capital and labor income tax rates have much smaller
eﬀects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and deﬁnes the scope ofour analysis. Section 3 summarizes the changes in the exogenous variables that we feed into the
model. Section 4 summarizes the economic restrictions and regulations adopted during World War
II. Section 5 presents the model and model parameterization. Section 6 conducts the quantitative
analysis by comparing the model to the data. Section 7 discusses our ﬁndings in light of the
issues raised in the literature. Section 8 summarizes the sensitivity analysis we conduct. Section 9
summarizes and concludes.
2. Literature Review and the Scope of Analysis
We are unaware of any comprehensive assessment of the impact of World War II on the
U.S. economy, particularly any studies that systematically address all of the open questions about
the neoclassical model’s ability to account for the wartime economy. Speciﬁcally, there are questions
about the conformity of all of the key variables in the growth model: the World War II boom in
output and labor, the components of output (consumption and investment), and changes in pre-
and post-tax factor prices and returns.2 These are all open questions because none of the studies
cited below simulate the model’s response to the World War II shock to compare the model’s
equilibrium path to U.S. data. This paper will address these questions.
There are a number of questions about labor supply and after-tax wages. Mulligan (1998)
and Baxter and King (1993) question the ability of the neoclassical model to account for labor
supply and after-tax factor price changes during World War II. They are motivated by the fact
that two opposing forces impact hours worked during wars. Higher government spending will tend
to increase labor, but higher taxes may decrease labor. Mulligan focuses his analysis on World War
II. He conjectures that the neoclassical model cannot plausibly account for the large increase in
World War II labor supply, as he shows that after-tax wages and returns to capital during the war
are not particularly high. Mulligan concludes that the model would require patriotism, modeled as
preference shifts, to jointly account for wartime labor supply and factor prices. Baxter and King
raise a similar concern, questioning whether the model can account for the boom in labor supply
given the large tax increases that occurred during World War II. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Fisher (2004) question the ability of the standard neoclassical model to account for macroeconomic
changes during post–World War II military episodes, rather than World War II. They argue that
the model needs to be augmented with habit formation and investment adjustment costs.
There are also questions about pre-tax wages. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) focus on
the impact of military spending shocks on pre-tax real wages. They note that the neoclassical
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markets, can only account for higher pre-tax real wages during World War II with a shift in the
production function, through either capital accumulation and/or a technological shift. This leads
them to conjecture that the model requires signiﬁcant, time-varying markups to account for pre-tax
wages.3 We will therefore compare pre-tax real wages from our competitive model to actual pre-tax
real wages to address this issue.
Finally, there are questions about changes in the composition of output between consump-
tion and investment during periods of large ﬁscal shocks. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use a
vector autoregression (VAR) to analyze the impact of post–World War II military spending shocks.
They do not focus their analysis on any particular theoretical model, but argue that their VAR
results regarding the decrease in private investment in response to military spending shocks are a
challenge for most theories. We will therefore compare the division of output between investment
and consumption to address questions about the response of the components of output to the war
shock. Another reason to examine the division of output is because the composition of expenditure
changed signiﬁcantly during the war. Employment in motor vehicles and housing (consumer goods)
fell substantially, while employment in other sectors, such as steel and chemicals, expanded consid-
erably. These compositional changes at the industry level may potentially shift the distribution of
output at the aggregate level between consumption and investment.
All of these questions fall under the umbrella of the broad issue that we address here: what
are the quantitative successes and failures of the neoclassical model for understanding the World
War II macroeconomy? We address this question (and by implication, the other questions cited
above) as follows. We ﬁrst identify the time series of the wartime changes in exogenous variables,
feed these variables into a parameterized model, compute the equilibrium, and then graphically
compare the actual time series of each endogenous variable (output and its components, labor, and
factor prices) to their model counterparts for the years 1939–1946.
We focus our analysis on World War II because it is the most important ﬁscal shock in
the history of the United States; the shocks are by far the largest and are also very likely to be
exogenous. These features of World War II provide a unique environment for testing the neoclassical
model. Other military episodes, such as the Vietnam War or the defense buildup during the Carter
and Reagan administrations, are much smaller in terms of changes in spending, taxes, and the
draft. These other episodes are certainly interesting to study but are beyond the scope of this
paper.
33. Exogenous Variables
This section summarizes the exogenous variables that we include in the model. The three
types of government policy (ﬁscal) variables are : government spending on consumption and in-
vestment goods, income tax rates, and the draft. We call this the ﬁscal state of the economy. In
addition to these ﬁscal variables, we also include productivity shocks. Figure 1 displays all six ex-
ogenous variables. The most striking feature of these data is their magnitude. These large changes
provide an excellent testing ground for evaluating the neoclassical model.
The ﬁrst series in Figure 1 is our measure of real government consumption and is total
government spending less government investment and military compensation, all real. The source
of the government spending data is the U.S. Department of Commerce (1975, Series F167; 1986,
Tables 1.2, 3.7A, and 3.8A; and 1987, Table B12). The second series in Figure 1 is our measure
of real government investment in plant and equipment that is used in the production of goods
and services. This investment is total investment by federal, state, and local government less
investment in military equipment and structures. Much of the government investment in this
period was in government-owned, privately operated capital. This capital investment in equipment
and factories substituted for private investment. We divide the series for government consumption
and investment by the population over 16 from U.S. Department of Commerce (1975, Series A39)
and by the growth rate of labor-augmenting technology, which we estimate at 2 percent per year.
To put the expenditure series in interpretable units, we also divide them by nonmilitary output in
1946, where nonmilitary output is gross national product (GNP) less military compensation.
The ﬁgure shows that both categories of government spending rose signiﬁcantly over the
course of the war. At the beginning and end of the war, government consumption is about 20
percent of trend nonmilitary output. At its peak, government consumption rises to almost 50
percent of trend nonmilitary output. Nonmilitary government investment doubles between 1941
and 1942, reaching almost 9 percent of trend nonmilitary output.
The third and fourth series in Figure 1 are estimates of labor and capital income tax rates
from Joines (1981, Series MTRL1 and MTRK1). The most striking feature is that tax rates rose
signiﬁcantly. Labor taxes more than doubled between 1939 and 1945, rising from about 8 percent
to about 20 percent. Capital tax rates rose about 50 percent, from a little over 40 percent to more
than 60 percent. The ﬁfth series in Figure 1 shows the fraction of the working-age population in the
military. The fraction rises from less than 2 percent before the war to more than 11 percent at the
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spending, labor income tax rates, capital income tax rates, and the number of individuals drafted—
rose substantially during the war.
In addition to these ﬁscal variables, we also include productivity shocks. The last series in
Figure 1 shows detrended total factor productivity (TFP). We measure TFP using a capital share
of 0.38 (we include both government and private capital) and a labor share of 0.62. Output used in
the calculation of TFP is GNP less military compensation, which we refer to as nonmilitary output.
The source of the GNP data is the U.S. Department of Commerce (1986, Table 1.2). The capital
stock is the sum of private and public capital used in producing nonmilitary output; we exclude
military equipment and structures. The source of the capital stock data is U.S. Department of
Commerce (1987, Tables A6, A9, A15, A17, and A19). The labor input in the calculation of TFP
is nonmilitary manhours reported in Kendrick (1961, Table A-X). We detrend TFP at its average
growth rate of 1.2 percent per year. Detrended TFP rises 13 percent between 1941 and 1945 and
25 percent between 1939 and 1945. After 1945, TFP falls.
There are a number of reasons why the increase in TFP is indeed plausible. The literature
notes several factors, including signiﬁcant increases in research and development spending (R&D),
the development of management science procedures and operations research practices, and sub-
stantial government infrastructure investment, which signiﬁcantly raised TFP above trend during
this period.
Regarding R&D spending, Mowery and Rosenberg (2000) document that real federal R&D
expenditures rose from $83 million in 1930 to $1.31 billion (in 1930 dollars) in 1945.5 This large
increase in spending, which was concentrated among leading ﬁrms in science-based industries and
research universities, plausibly led to signiﬁcant productivity advances in a variety of industries.
R&D grants were primarily managed by the Oﬃce of Scientiﬁc Research and Development, which
entered into research partnerships with many leading universities and corporations, including 75
contracts with MIT. In conjunction with these grants, members of the scientiﬁc community were
mobilized to recommend, guide, and participate in scientiﬁc research. Mowery and Rosenberg note
that this advent of federal funding of R&D was the precursor of postwar federally funded and
subsidized R&D programs.
Mowery and Rosenberg (2000) note that these R&D expenditures raised productivity in a
number of manufacturing industries, including airframes, shipping, radar, microwave technology,
5and fertilizer. Similarly, Davies and Stammers (1975) report that other industries with signiﬁcant
advances included air travel, synthetic rubber, oxygen steel, titanium, jet propulsion, silicones,
urethanes, polythenes, chemotherapy, polymers, insecticides, nylon, and Teﬂon. Bullard (1975)
reports large advances in electronics and instrumentation.
Kendrick (1961) reports output per hour and TFP for several of these industries for selected
years, including 1937, 1948, and 1953. Regarding the 1937–1948 period, TFP in the manufacturing
sector rose 19 percent (with no adjustment made for trend growth). The gains are relatively high
in several of the sectors that were aﬀected by these R&D programs, including chemicals and allied
products (up 49 percent), electrical machinery (up 26 percent), miscellaneous and instruments (up
25 percent), and primary metals (up 42 percent). These gains between 1937 and 1948, however,
probably represent a lower bound on an estimate of technological change during the war, because the
postwar conversion of the economy likely temporarily lowered productivity. For example, Kendrick
(1961) reports that economy-wide TFP fell by 2.3 percent between 1946 and 1948, and rose by 13
percent between 1948 and 1953. Moreover, it is likely that the productivity decline between 1946
and 1948 was larger in the manufacturing sector, because that sector was relatively more aﬀected
by the reconversion. This suggests calculating productivity change between 1937 and 1953, which
is the next available year after 1948, as an alternative measure of wartime technological change.
This is probably an upper bound, given that it is seven years after World War II. Between 1937
and 1953, manufacturing TFP is about 34 percent higher, and TFP in the other sectors cited above
are up about 83 percent, 61 percent, 45 percent, and 45 percent, respectively. Calculations made
over both of these time intervals indicate that productivity growth in these four sectors that were
particularly impacted by R&D activity is well above average.
The literature also reports other sources of productivity advances. Davies and Stammers
(1975) discuss that a signiﬁcant source of World War II productivity growth was the development of
management science and operations research practices by industrial scientists. These practices led
to increased eﬃciency in factory output and more broadly in organizations. Field (2003) cites other
factors that raised productivity during the war, including signiﬁcant government infrastructure
investment in roads, highways, bridges, and airports during this period. Moreover, he notes that
the very high levels of private R&D spending of the 1930s likely continued to have productivity
spillovers into the 1940s. Finally, Alchian (1963), among several other economists, has argued that
wartime learning-by-doing raised productivity considerably.
As Figure 1 shows, total factor productivity declined after the war was over. Gordon (1969),
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ble because a substantial fraction of plant and equipment that was built during the war for military
purposes was converted to private production after the war. This conversion eﬀort, which included
the disassembling of some equipment and plants, as well as the conversion of plants to produce
diﬀerent goods, likely reduced productivity, particularly in the manufacturing sector, in the imme-
diate postwar period. The fact that productivity rose sharply in 1949 and 1950 is also consistent
with this view.
While quantitatively accounting for the contribution of all of these factors to aggregate
productivity change both during and after the war is beyond the scope of this study, this evidence
does indicate that total factor productivity growth was higher than normal during the war and that
productivity declined temporarily after the war. Our baseline approach will treat this productivity
change as exogenous and assess its implications for the wartime economy. Since changes in capacity
utilization could account for some of the change in the Solow residual during this period, we will
consider a version of our model with variable capacity in our sensitivity analyses.
4. Wartime Economic Restrictions and Regulations
A number of economic restrictions and regulations were adopted during World War II that
are not present during peacetime. Major restrictions include nominal wage and price controls and
rationing (through ration coupons) of meat, butter, gasoline, sugar and other nondurable goods, de
facto rationing of some durable goods, such as autos and residential capital, which were produced in
very small quantities during the war, and Federal Reserve management and control of U.S. Treasury
security markets that ﬁxed the nominal interest rates on these securities between 3/8 of 1 percent
for short-term Treasury debt to 2.5 percent for long-term Treasury debt.6
Whether these restrictions had quantitatively important eﬀects on the major macroeconomic
aggregates during this period is an open question because there is no work addressing this question
within the growth model. The impact of these restrictions is also uncertain because economic agents
found ways to get around at least some of these restrictions. For example, the trading of ration
coupons and the emergence of black markets allowed households to at least partially oﬀset the
impact of rationing, and ﬁrms supplemented salaries with non-wage beneﬁts to oﬀset the impact
of wage controls (see Rockoﬀ 1984).
A model that captured these regulations and restrictions would diﬀer considerably from the
standard growth model we are interested in testing. For example, understanding the apparent
7success of the Federal Reserve’s interest rate ﬁxing policy would require a model that included the
many restrictions on the types of assets that could be held by regulated intermediaries, because
almost all federal debt was held by these institutions.7 Including these regulations would clearly
add signiﬁcantly to the complexity of the model and would preclude us from assessing how well the
standard model does. We therefore abstract from these ﬁnancial regulations and restrictions.
We also abstract from monetary factors because monetary policy was fundamentally tied to
the Treasury’s ﬁnancing of the war through the pegging of interest rates. We therefore leave this
very interesting and challenging issue for further research.
Here we assess how well a simple model without coupon rationing and price and wage
controls, without constrained investment in certain sub-sectors of the economy, and without control
of the pricing of government debt/monetary policy can account for the U.S. data during World War
II. This simple approach is a natural ﬁrst step in assessing World War II, because if any of these
abstractions are quantitatively important, then the model will fail noticeably along one or more
dimensions.
5. Model Economy
We start with a standard neoclassical model and tailor it to study the impact of wartime
shocks. The model includes government consumption, government investment in physical capital,
government payments to military personnel, taxation of capital and labor income, and the draft.
There is an inﬁnitely lived representative family with two types of family members: “civil-
ians” and “draftees.” Both types of family members have identical preferences given by U(c,l) =
log(c) + V (1 − l), where V is a concave and continuously diﬀerentiable function. There are Nt
total family members in period t, with fraction at who are in the military and fraction (1 − at)
who are civilians. This speciﬁcation allows us to distinguish between civilian workers available for
production (1 − at), and the hours worked by the civilians (lct).
In each period t, the family optimally chooses consumption of both types, which we denote
by cct and cdt, respectively. The family also chooses private investment in physical capital, ipt,
civilian labor input, lct, and next period government bond holdings bt+1 to maximize its lifetime
utility. Labor input for family members in the military is exogenously ﬁxed at ¯ ld. The family’s










(1 − at)cct + atcdt + ipt + bt+1 (2)
= (1 − τkt)rptkpt + (1 − τlt)wt(1 − at)lct + τktδkpt + Rtbt + (1 − τlt)wtat¯ ld + Tt
kpt+1 = [(1 − δ)kpt + ipt]/(1 + γn) (3)
Nt = (1 + γn)t (4)
cct,cdt,ipt ≥ 0, (5)
where kpt is the beginning-of-period capital stock in period t, rpt is the rental rate paid for that
capital, wt is the wage rate in t, τkt and τlt are proportional tax rates on capital income and labor
income, respectively, in t, Rtbt is the value of matured government debt, and Tt are government
transfers.8 All quantities are in per capita terms; the constant growth rate of the population Nt is
given by γn. The processes for at, rpt, wt, τkt, τlt, Rt, and Tt are viewed exogenously by the family
and are speciﬁed later.
Distinguishing between workers and hours per worker is required for our robustness analysis
that extends the benchmark model to include variable capacity utilization. Moreover, this speci-
ﬁcation is useful because the marginal disutility of working for those in the army does not aﬀect
the choices made by civilians. This is important because there is considerable uncertainty over
this marginal disutility of labor for the draftees, as there is limited information on the number
of hours worked by those in the military during this period, and the disutility of military work
probably diﬀers from private work. Thus, any errors in measuring the work disutility of draftees
will not aﬀect the private choices in our formulation, which is very similar to that in Hansen (1985),
Kydland and Prescott (1991), Cole and Ohanian (2002), and Hayashi and Prescott (2002), all of
which distinguish between workers and hours per worker.9
There is a single physical good that is produced from a constant returns to scale technology.
The technology is operated by a competitive representative ﬁrm, which hires private capital, public
capital, and labor services. Output, which we measure as nonmilitary output, is given by
Yt = F(Kpt,Kgt,ZtLpt), (6)
where Kpt is the beginning-of-period private capital stock for the economy in t, Kgt is the beginning-
of-period public capital stock used by the private sector in t, Zt is the level of labor-augmenting
technology in t, and Lpt is the total labor input in the nonmilitary sector in t. We assume that the
9level of labor-augmenting technology is equal to zt(1 + γz)t, where zt is a productivity shock.
We include government capital in production because the federal government ﬁnanced in-
creases in industrial construction and producers’ durable equipment during World War II, including
signiﬁcant investments in the aircraft, automotive, and aluminum industries. Gordon (1969) es-
timates that government-owned, privately operated capital increased the manufacturing capital
stock by 30 percent between 1940 and 1945. (See also Gordon (1970), Jaszi (1970), and Wasson,
Musgrave, and Harkins (1970).) We denote government investment expenditures by Ig.
Government purchases of consumption goods are denoted by Cg, and government payments
to military personnel are denoted by Ntwtat¯ ld. Total government spending is the sum of the three
expenditure items:
Gt = Cgt + Igt + Ntwtat¯ ld. (7)
Government capital evolves according to the following law of motion:
Kgt+1 = (1 − δ)Kgt + Igt (8)
with Kg0 and the process for Igt given. We assume that private and public capital depreciate at
the same rate δ. We also assume that the government satisﬁes the present value budget balance.
The government budget constraint is given by
Bt+1 = Gt + RtBt − τltNtwt((1 − at)lct + at¯ ld) − τkt(rpt − δ)Kpt − rgtKgt + Tt. (9)
We close the model by specifying the functions that the family treats exogenously when
solving its optimization problem in (1). Since ﬁrms are competitive, the rental prices for the
factors of production are equal to their marginal products. Therefore, the rental rates in (2) and
(9) and the wage rate in (2) are equal to the partial derivatives of the production function F in
(6) with respect to Kp, Kg, and Lp, respectively. Government debt that is accumulated during the
war is retired following the war. The technical appendix (McGrattan and Ohanian 2008) shows
that the results are not sensitive to alternative speciﬁcations of postwar tax rates that retire this
wartime debt.
There are six exogenous variables in the model: conscription (at), the tax rate on capital
income (τkt), the tax rate on labor income (τlt), government consumption (Cgt), government invest-
ment (Igt), and labor-augmenting productivity (zt). The evolution of the six exogenous variables
10is governed by a state variable, st, which speciﬁes a particular set of values for at, τlt, τkt, Cgt, Igt,
and zt.
An equilibrium for this economy consists of the following: allocations for households cct, cdt,
lct, ipt, and kpt; inputs for ﬁrms Kpt, Kgt, and Lpt; and sequences of prices rpt, rgt, wt, and Rt
that satisfy the following conditions: (i) taking prices and exogenous policies for at, τkt, and τlt as
given, households maximize utility subject to constraints (2)–(5); (ii) taking prices as given, ﬁrms
maximize proﬁts period by period Y − rpKp − rgKg − wLp; (iii) factor markets clear:
Kpt = Ntkpt (10)
Lpt = Nt(1 − at)lct; (11)
(iv) the resource constraint
Cpt + Ipt + Cgt + Igt = Yt (12)
holds, where Cpt = Nt[atcct + (1 − at)cdt] and Ipt = Ntipt; and (v) (9) is satisﬁed.
To test the robustness of our results, we will also consider a version of the model in which
there is variable capacity utilization. We will see that the results are not sensitive to this modiﬁ-
cation, and therefore we present the variable capacity model in McGrattan and Ohanian (2008).
Table 1 summarizes the values of all parameters, which we discuss in detail below. Prefer-
ences are given by
U(c,l) = log(c) + ψ(1 − l)ξ/ξ, (13)
which implies a compensated labor supply elasticity of (1 − l)/[l(1 − ξ)]. We choose a benchmark
value of ξ = 0, which implies log preferences over leisure. In McGrattan and Ohanian (2008), we
evaluate the robustness of our results by choosing a value of ξ that yields a lower labor supply
elasticity.
The parameter ψ is chosen so that the fraction of time allocated to nonmilitary work in the
deterministic steady state is 26.6 percent, which is consistent with the observed U.S. average over
the period 1946–1960. In principle, we also need to specify the exogenous hours requirement for
those in the military. We use 50 hours per week, which lies between estimates of average hours
per week for civilian workers in the federal government (see Kendrick 1961) and average hours per
11week for military workers in basic training (see Siu 2008). This choice does not aﬀect our results,
since the level of military hours does not impact private choices.
We assume that government capital and private capital are perfect substitutes. As discussed
above, this is a reasonable assumption, as most of this government investment was in government-
owned, privately operated plant and equipment. The technology is given by
F(kp,kg,zl) = (kp + kg)θ(zl)1−θ, (14)
implying that TFP is equal to z1−θ. We chose θ = 0.38, which is consistent with the U.S. share of
income paid to capital during this period. The parameter β is chosen so that the capital-output
ratio is consistent with the U.S. level during the war. The depreciation rate (δ) for both government
and private capital is 5.5 percent.
The growth rates of trend labor-augmenting technological progress and the population are
set to their average values over this period: γz = 2.0 percent and γn = 1.5 percent.
For our baseline results, we assume that households have perfect foresight about the paths of
exogenous variables in Figure 1. For years beyond 1946, we assume that the values in 1946 persist.
In McGrattan and Ohanian (2008) we analyze stochastic simulations of our model and alternative
scenarios for postwar expectations. We also show how to compute the equilibrium decision functions
for our model in both the deterministic and stochastic cases using a ﬁnite element method. (See
also McGrattan 1996.)
6. Comparing the Model to the Data
We compare seven variables from the model to their counterparts in the U.S. data. Real
GNP, consumption, investment, two measures of hours worked, and two measures of factor produc-
tivity are compared to U.S. counterparts derived from the national income and product accounts
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1986), the reproducible tangible wealth tables (U.S. Department
of Commerce 1987), and data on manhours (Kendrick 1961).
We compare production plus military compensation in the model (Y + wNa¯ ld) to real
U.S. GNP. We compare private consumption in the model to U.S. personal consumption expendi-
tures on nondurables and services, and we compare private investment in the model to U.S. gross
private domestic investment plus durable consumption expenditures. We subtract indirect business
taxes for sales from GNP and consumption expenditures. We impute a service ﬂow for durables
12equal, in real terms, to 4 percent times the stock of durables.10 For both the model and the data,
we report GNP, consumption, and investment in per capita detrended terms as we did for the
government spending series in Figure 1. Speciﬁcally, we divide the series by the population over 16
and by the growth rate of labor-augmenting technology.
We compare per capita nonmilitary hours worked in the model to nonmilitary hours from
Kendrick (1961) divided by the population over 16. For completeness, we compare total per capita
hours—nonmilitary plus military—in the model ((1−a)lc+a¯ ld) to total U.S. manhours in Kendrick
(1961) divided by the population over 16. Both the actual and model per capita hours series are
normalized by discretionary time, which is 12 hours per day.
Finally, we compare measures of factor productivities in the model and data. For capital,
we compare nonmilitary output Y divided by total capital Kp+Kg to its counterpart in U.S. data.
The output and capital measures are the same as that used in computing TFP. To put this ratio
in more interpretable units—that is, in the units of an after-tax return—we multiply both the
U.S. and model series by the capital share times one minus the tax rate on capital (θ(1− τk)) and
then subtract the depreciation rate δ. For labor, we compare nonmilitary output Y divided by
nonmilitary hours Lp multiplied by (1−θ)(1−τl) to its counterpart in U.S. data. In the appendix,
we also discuss several alternative measures of factor returns and how they compare to the model’s
predictions.
We calculate the equilibrium of the model beginning in 1939, given initial values for private
and public capital, which we take from the U.S. Department of Commerce (1987). We compare the
results to the data by plotting the actual realizations of output, consumption, investment, labor,
and factor productivities between 1939 and 1946 against the model realizations for these variables.
A. Results
Figures 2–4 show the results.11 The lines with open squares are the U.S. series, and the lines
with the ﬁlled circles are the model series. The main ﬁnding is that the time series for the model
and data are quite similar. The model captures the magnitude of the changes that occur in these
variables, and also captures much of the timing of these changes as well.
The ﬁrst plot in Figure 2 is real detrended GNP. Both model and data GDP rise about 40
percent over the course of the war, and both decline signiﬁcantly after 1945. The second plot shows
private consumption in both the model and the data. Model consumption shows almost no change,
while actual consumption shows a decline of about 2 percent between 1939 and 1944. The third
13plot in Figure 2 shows that private investment in both the model and the data declines signiﬁcantly
through 1944, and then recovers after government spending declines after 1945. Thus, the model
reproduces several main features of actual wartime changes in output and its components.
Figure 3 plots nonmilitary hours, which is the focus of the analysis, as well as total hours.
All of these series are divided by the 1946–1960 U.S. average fraction of time at work to provide
hours measures that are relative to a postwar trend. Both the data and the model show a signiﬁcant
increase in hours during the war, followed by a decline. The main deviation between the model
and the data is in terms of timing; the model hours initially rise more quickly than actual hours,
and model hours begin declining one year before actual hours decline. Part of the reason for
this deviation is our choice of perfect foresight. In McGrattan and Ohanian (2008), we relax this
assumption but still ﬁnd that hours rise too much initially relative to U.S. hours because households
expect higher future tax rates on labor.
Figure 4 shows measures of after-tax factor returns. The ﬁrst plot shows the time series for
the after-tax marginal product of capital (as a percentage). The model predicts a return that is
roughly 3.4 percent for the ﬁrst half of the war, rising to about 3.9 percent in 1944, then declining
afterward. The actual return is quite similar, averaging 3.4 percent early in the war, rising to about
4 percent, and then declining afterward.
The second plot in Figure 4 is the after-tax return to labor. As before, nonmilitary hours
are normalized; they are divided by the 1946–1960 average fraction of discretionary time in work.
During the war, the model shows a slight increase in the after-tax return to labor of about 2.8
percent between 1941 and 1944, whereas the actual return shows a slight decrease of −.6 percent.
But, as we show later, the prediction of little change in the after-tax return to labor is consistent
with most U.S. measures of this return. After the war, both returns show a steep decline.
B. Discussion
To understand the economic forces driving these results, we present the relative contribu-
tions of each exogenous variable. We do this by computing the equilibrium of the model for the
following set of experiments: the ﬁrst experiment has only government spending, as the values of
all other exogenous variables are held ﬁxed at their 1939 values. The second experiment adds to
(1) productivity shocks, the third adds to (2) the draft, and the fourth adds to (3) distorting taxes,
which is the full model.12 We compare results across these experiments to see how the addition of
each variable impacts the results.
14Tables 2 and 3 show the results of these four experiments for the two labor market variables,
hours worked and the after-tax wage. We choose these two variables for this detailed analysis
because they have attracted the most attention in the literature. The experiments show that
government spending has the largest impact on the economy, that all the shocks have substantial
eﬀects, and that consequently all shocks are required for the model to match the data as closely as
it does.
Table 2 shows that government purchases have the largest quantitative impact, as they
increase nonmilitary hours by nearly 30 percent on average during the period 1939–1946. That is,
if the war only involved higher government spending, then the theory predicts that hours should
have increased about four times as much as observed. Instead, the reason that model hours are on
average similar to actual hours is largely due to higher labor income taxes, which reduce hours by
as much as 16 percentage points at the peak of the war, and to the draft, which reduces hours by
as much as 6 percentage points.
Thus, the key reason in the model that nonmilitary hours rise is because of the enormous
resource cost of the war. This eﬀect is attenuated somewhat by higher taxes, which reduces the
incentive to work, and by the draft, which reduces the household’s time endowment. Productivity
tends to reduce hours early, as households foresee higher future productivity, and it then generates
somewhat higher hours toward the end of the war as productivity peaks.
Table 3 shows the results for after-tax wages. Again, government spending has the largest
impact in the model. In the absence of other shocks, the wartime expenditure shock drives down
the after-tax wage 20 percent below trend by the end of the war. As in Table 2, higher taxes and
the draft oﬀset some of the impact of higher government spending. Productivity has a large impact
on wages, increasing wages by about 15 to 20 percent at the end of the war.
Table 3 also compares the model after-tax wage to a number of after-tax wage measures
from the data. It is useful to make a broad comparison across alternative wage measures since the
data may have some measurement error, and because diﬀerent wage series have been used in the
literature.13
Most of the empirical measures are similar to the model wage. Labor productivity rises by 1
percent, and its average is 1 percent above trend. The wage of all civilian workers rises by about 8
percent, and its average is on trend. The nonfarm wage initially declines, and then rises. Its mean
is 4 percent above trend. The manufacturing wage declines by about 8 percent, but its average is
155 percent above trend. Recall that the model wage rises about 6 percent between 1939 and 1943,
to roughly 3 percent above trend, and its average value during the war is on trend.
The after-tax manufacturing wage diﬀers from the other wage measures. It falls the most
over the war, and despite this decline, its average is also the highest above trend. These features
of the manufacturing wage are likely due to New Deal labor policies, which signiﬁcantly impacted
manufacturing. Speciﬁcally, manufacturing wages rose considerably above trend in the 1930s, as a
consequence of the National Industrial Recovery Act (1933) and the National Labor Relations Act
(1935), both of which increased labor bargaining power (see Cole and Ohanian (2004)). However,
real manufacturing wages then began declining during the war, reﬂecting policy changes that re-
duced union bargaining power, including the National War Labor Board, which reduced negotiated
wage increases in several industries (see Cole and Ohanian (2004) and Atelson (1998)).
Given that manufacturing wages were impacted by changes in unionization policies before
and during the war, it is diﬃcult to use the manufacturing wage, or changes in that wage, to
measure the changes in the incentive to work. New Deal labor policies had a smaller impact on
broader measures of wages, such as the other three measures in the table. Consequently, the broader
wage measures, with changes that range from a ﬂat proﬁle over the war (labor productivity) to an
increasing wage proﬁle (wage for all civilians), are better comparisons to the model wage.
In summary, this comparison shows that both model hours and wages are similar to their
data analogues. The following section presents additional analysis of hours and wages to address
Mulligan’s (1998) view that higher hours are a puzzle during the war. It also addresses other
reservations about the model that have been expressed in the literature.
7. Addressing the Critiques
Section 2 presented a number of critiques of whether the model can successfully account for
the impact of World War II. We now address those critiques.
A. Analyzing After-Tax Wages and Hours
The main critiques concern the neoclassical model’s ability to account for patterns in after-
tax wages and hours. We begin with Mulligan’s critique (1998). His analysis includes two of the
wage series we use (civilian and manufacturing), and concludes that the after-tax real wages were
not suﬃciently high to induce higher hours: “Empirical support ... cannot be found because after-
tax wages do not appear to be temporarily high during the war period. The primary force working
16against wage motives is the massive across-the-board income tax increases that occurred during
the war” (p. 1071).14
To address this issue, we assess how much wages would have to rise in the model to generate
the observed increase in nonmilitary hours, and we then compare that model wage to observed
wages. To do this, we consider that there may be measurement error in the available tax rate
estimates, and we construct a sequence of tax rates such that hours in the model between 1939 and
1946 are equal to actual hours:
lm
pt(ˆ τt) = ld
pt, t = 1939,... ,1946, (15)
where lm
pt is per capita nonmilitary hours in the model, ˆ τt is the constructed tax rate, and ld
pt is
actual nonmilitary hours divided by the population over 16.
Figure 5 shows the model wage that generates the observed increase in military hours (which
we call the “model implied wage”) and also shows the four empirical wage measures: the manu-
facturing wage, the nonfarm wage, labor productivity, and the civilian wage. These are all pre-tax
measures since we are starting from the premise that tax rates may be mismeasured. The empirical
measures are all detrended by the growth in technology and reported relative to their respective
averages between 1946 and 1960.
To match the path of U.S. nonmilitary hours, we need a tax rate series that averages about
15 percent and rises less over the period 1939–1946 than the Joines’ (1981) tax rate series. (See
McGrattan and Ohanian (2008) for a graph of alternative measures of the labor tax rate.) If taxes
are rising between 1939 and 1946 and households perfectly anticipate higher labor tax rates in the
future, then they increase their hours early in the period to take advantage of the low tax rates.
During the ﬁrst few years, TFP is also relatively low, but it is a less important factor for labor
supply than the tax on labor.
In terms of comparing percentage increases in the wage series over the war, the implied model
wage series rises less than the most comparable empirical wage measures. The implied model wage
rises about 12 percent between 1939 and 1945 compared to increases of about 16 percent for actual
labor productivity, about 14 percent for the nonfarm wage, and about 22 percent for the civilian
wage. It is virtually identical to actual labor productivity between 1939 and 1942, and remains
within 2 percentage points between 1943 and 1946. The implied model wage lies between the other
wages series, as it is below the nonfarm wage and manufacturing wage, and is above the civilian
wage through 1942. By 1943, all of the empirical measures are above the implied model wage.
17The implied model wage increase is higher than the manufacturing wage, which increases
about 6 percent, though as we noted earlier, manufacturing is probably the least informative of
these wage measures due to the fact that manufacturing wages were impacted by changes in New
Deal labor policies. Note that the average percentage increase across all four wage measures is 12
percent, which is the percentage increase in the model wage for this experiment. This suggests that
the observed increase in nonmilitary hours is consistent with observed changes in wages.
These results raise the question of how much would labor tax rates have to rise in order to
eliminate higher hours worked. To address this question, we calculated the model equilibrium with
labor tax rates such that hours worked on average were equal to their trend value. We ﬁnd that tax
rates would have to be much larger than those reported by Joines (1981)—or any other estimates
of U.S. tax rates—to prevent nonmilitary hours from rising in the model. The tax rates would
have had to jump to 25 percent at the start of the war and continue to rise to close to 30 percent
by 1943. (See McGrattan and Ohanian 2008.) When we rerun the experiment varying capital tax
rates, we ﬁnd that even when they are set to 100 percent during the war, hours rise.
The main reason why hours rise so much is because of the enormous government spend-
ing increase. The present value of war expenditures, measured as the diﬀerence between actual
government expenditures between 1939 and 1945 and peacetime government expenditures, is 180
percent of steady state GDP. This large reduction in wealth induces higher hours. Note that at the
peak of the war in 1944, total government spending was a little over 80 percent of trend output.
This means that if labor had not increased, private consumption would have dropped substantially.
Households in the model respond to this large resource drain by working more.
B. Other Critiques
Regarding other critiques, Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) raise questions about the neo-
classical model’s ability to account for pre-tax real wages during wars and during other periods
of large exogenous increases in government spending. The average percent deviation between the
pre-tax marginal product of labor in the perfect foresight model and in the data between 1941 and
1946 is −.2 percent, with the largest annual percent deviation during this period equal to 2 percent.
As we see from Figure 5, with the exception of the manufacturing wage rate, the other measures
are close to the marginal product of labor.15
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) have questioned the ability of the theory to account for the
division of output between consumption and investment in response to large ﬁscal shocks. In 1944,
18private consumption’s share of GNP in the perfect foresight model is 40 percent, compared to 37
percent in U.S. data. In 1944, private investment’s share of GNP in the perfect foresight model is
2 percent, compared to 6 percent in U.S. data.
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004) ﬁnd that the neoclassical model requires additional
features, including habit formation in preferences and investment adjustment costs, to account
for movements in labor during periods of post–World War II military buildups. Resolving these
diﬀerences is beyond the scope of this study, as the methodologies and the episodes studied diﬀer
considerably in the two papers. We therefore leave this for future research.
8. Sensitivity Analysis
In McGrattan and Ohanian (2008) we present detailed results on additional experiments
that further assess the robustness of our results. First, we evaluate how low the labor supply
elasticity would have to be such that, on average, nonmilitary hours did not rise during the war.
Second, we introduce variable capacity utilization in our model, allowing for variation in the number
of employed and the number of hours in the workweek, since both rose signiﬁcantly during the
war. Third, we conduct diﬀerent experiments varying household expectations about the exogenous
variables, altering the timing of when households learn about the war, what they expect to happen
during the war, and what they expect after the war. Here, we brieﬂy describe the results for each
of these experiments; further details can be found in McGrattan and Ohanian (2008).
To keep the average level of nonmilitary hours equal to its trend, we need the labor supply
elasticity to drop by more than a factor of eight relative to the log utility case used in the benchmark
model. The elasticity for the log utility case is 2.75 percent compared to 0.32 percent in this
experiment. This latter elasticity is much too low for an aggregate representative household model.
To see this, consider replacing the log utility function in the prototype business cycle models
studied by McGrattan (1994) with (13). We can set ψ and ξ so as to achieve the same steady-state
hours worked and lower labor elasticities. In her benchmark case with technology shocks only and
divisible labor, a labor elasticity of 0.5 generates a standard deviation of hours worked equal to 0.3;
the standard deviation for U.S. hours is 1.52. (See McGrattan 1994, Table 1.) Similar results are
found for her model with taxes. In that case, a labor elasticity of 0.5 generates a standard deviation
of hours worked equal to 0.51—again, much lower than that in the data. For a labor elasticity of
0.32, the results are even more striking: the standard deviations of hours worked predicted by the
model are in the range of 0.22 to 0.38—signiﬁcantly below the data. This implies that implausibly
19low aggregate labor supply elasticities are required in our model to choke oﬀ the World War II
economic expansion.
Our second experiment involves adding variable capacity, along the lines of Kydland and
Prescott (1991). In this case, the technology is given by:
Yt = (htKt)θ(htZtNt)1−θ, (16)
in which h is the length of the workweek, N is private employment, K is the sum of public and
private capital, and Y is nonmilitary output. To induce endogenous variation in the workweek, we
assume individual preferences are given by
U(c,h) = log(c) + V (1 − h) − ηχ{h > 0}, (17)
where η measures the disutility of entering the workforce and χ is an indicator function. Aggregating
utility costs of entering the workforce across individuals yields an aggregate utility function that
depends on both the workweek and the number employed.
In terms of inputs in Figure 1, all remain the same with the variable capacity utilization
model except TFP, which is derived from (16). The time path of TFP does diﬀer from TFP
in Figure 1 for the benchmark case, but the response of the economy does not. Between 1941
and 1944, the TFP increase in the variable workweek model is about 10 percent, compared to an
increase of about 13 percent in the benchmark model. The responses of the endogenous variables
in the variable capacity model, however, are very similar to those from the benchmark model,
as the smaller increase in TFP in the variable workweek model is oﬀset by a larger impact of a
TFP change on the endogenous variables. For example, GNP in 1943 is 36 percent above trend
in the benchmark model and 33 percent above trend in the variable capacity utilization model.
Nonmilitary hours in 1943 are 11 percent above trend in the benchmark model and 9.4 percent in
the variable capacity utilization model. Because of the similarity, we report the results side-by-side
in McGrattan and Ohanian (2008).
When altering household expectations, we tried several diﬀerent experiments. We started
the analysis in 1941 rather than 1939. The change in timing of when the households learn about the
war hardly changes the results. We allowed for uncertainty about entering the war and its duration,
choosing transition matrices for the exogenous variables that generate time series consistent with
earlier U.S. wars. The main diﬀerences between the stochastic and deterministic results is the
pattern of consumption and nonmilitary hours. With uncertainty, the model generates some decline
20in consumption during the war and lower nonmilitary hours prior to the start of the war. But, the
overall quantitative ﬁt of the model is very similar for the deterministic and stochastic versions of
the model. When we change expectations about the exogenous variables in the postwar period,
we do generate large diﬀerences relative to the benchmark if we assume households expect TFP or
tax rates to fall back to levels seen in the Great Depression. However, if all ﬁscal states, including
government spending, are expected to fall back to 1930s levels while TFP is expected to remain
high, then we ﬁnd results similar to the benchmark case.
In summary, our sensitivity analysis shows that the results are fairly robust to changes in the
labor supply elasticity, to the inclusion of variable capacity utilization, and to varying expectations
about the timing and duration of the war and to plausible expectations about the postwar.
9. Summary and Conclusion
The behavior of the World War II economy was well outside normal bounds. Military
expenditures increased 500 percent, tax rates increased as much as 100 percent, the draft increased
500 percent, there was rationing, price and wage controls, and interest rate control of the public
debt, private investment fell nearly to zero, and output roughly doubled. There is no consensus
theoretical framework for understanding this important period, largely because there has been no
detailed quantitative assessment of alternative models in response to a ﬁscal shock, and policy
response, of this size.
This paper conducted the most comprehensive evaluation of the growth model to date in
response to World War II. We found that the behavior of the World War II economy was similar
to the neoclassical growth model simulated in response to wartime shocks. Speciﬁcally, the time
paths of output, consumption, investment, labor input, wage rates, and returns to capital from the
model in response to World War II government spending, the draft, tax rates, and productivity
shocks are quite similar to the data.
We conclude that the growth model, at least in the case of World War II, can reasonably
capture the quantitative impact of very large ﬁscal shocks. The results suggest several avenues for
future research. One is based on the interesting implication that the many wartime regulations
and restrictions adopted during World War II do not appear to signiﬁcantly impede the ability
of the model to account for several aggregate variables during this period. This suggests that an
important topic is to understand why these restrictions did not seem to have important eﬀects
on the aggregate economy. Another topic to investigate is the relatively low observed labor input
21at the early stages of the war, and the extent to which that is attributable to New Deal labor
policies that depressed employment, as suggested by Cole and Ohanian (2004). A third topic is
understanding the contribution of R&D, the development of operations research and management
sciences practices, and other factors to the wartime productivity increase. Finally, an international
comparison would provide useful variation between countries that sustained battle activity within
their borders (United Kingdom, France, Japan, Germany) and countries in which most of the war
was outside their borders (United States).
22Appendix. Alternative Measures of Factor Returns
In Section 6, we used marginal products constructed from U.S. data to assess the model’s
predictions for returns to capital and labor. In theory, we can also use factor incomes per unit of
input and, in the case of capital, returns on assets held by capital owners. In this Appendix, we
discuss these alternatives and relate them to the measures we used above. For labor, we ﬁnd that
the marginal product from the model accords well with measures of compensation per hour. For
capital, we ﬁnd that the marginal product on average is consistent with returns based on capital
incomes and stocks and with equity returns. We also explain why another measure of returns—
based on debt assets—is not the appropriate measure for our model economy because of regulations
and restrictions impacting the bond markets.
A. Return to Labor
In Figure 4, we compared measures of labor productivity (after tax) for the model and
U.S. data. Figure 5 plots the pre-tax labor productivity in the United States based on U.S. national
product, along with three measures of labor based on U.S. national income.16,17 All compensation
rates are divided ﬁrst by the deﬂator for GNP less military compensation and then by the growth
trend for technology.
The two broadest measures of aggregate real compensation per hour—nonfarm and civilian—
are very similar to the marginal product of labor from the model. These compensation measures
are the most reasonable comparison to the model marginal product because they are economy-wide
wage measures and because they are much less aﬀected by changes in union bargaining power than
is manufacturing compensation per hour. In particular, there were substantial declines in union
bargaining power during World War II. Cole and Ohanian (2004) argue that manufacturing wages
rose sharply in the mid- to late 1930s as a consequence of large increases in union bargaining power,
and that this bargaining power declined sharply during the 1940s. During the war, wages were no
longer set by collective bargaining, but rather by the National War Labor Board (NWLB), which
routinely rejected negotiated wage settlements between ﬁrms and unions. After the war, the Taft-
Hartley Act further reduced union bargaining power. Cole and Ohanian estimate that most of the
increase in manufacturing wages generated by unions/cartels in the 1930s had vanished by 1947 as a
result of the NWLB decisions. This ﬁnding is consistent with the fact that pre-tax manufacturing
23compensation per hour did not increase much during the war. (See Figure 5.) It is reasonable
to expect that introducing union bargaining, and distinguishing between manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors, would allow the model to account for diﬀerences between manufacturing
and non-manufacturing compensation. However, this is well beyond the scope of this analysis.
B. Return to Capital
In Figure 4, we used the after-tax marginal product of capital when comparing the return
to capital in the data and model. Here, we discuss three alternative measures for the empirical
counterpart of our model’s return: a measure of the return on capital found by dividing after-tax
capital income by the capital stock, a measure of the return on equities, and a measure of the
return on bonds.
First, we can compare the model’s return on capital to some measure of capital income
divided by the appropriate stock—both nominal since the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
does not report real incomes. Before making these comparisons, we need to address several issues
that arise when doing these calculations. One issue is data revisions: there have been signiﬁcant
revisions in nominal stock estimates across BEA reports, especially for structures. For example,
for the period 1941–1946, the BEA estimates show an average level for the current-cost net stock
of private nonresidential structures of $126.4 billion in the U.S. Department of Commerce (2002)
and $70.4 billion in U.S. Department of Commerce (1987). Another issue that arises, especially in
the case of World War II, is the possibility that factor payments by government to business are
not allocative period-by-period. For example, in cases where the capital was government-owned
but privately operated, many contracts prespeciﬁed the returns on the investment. (See Braun and
McGrattan 1993.) If capital returns are not allocative, then we can only compare average marginal
products with average per-unit incomes. A related issue is how to attribute returns to assets,
such as government assets, whose incomes are not included or imputed in the national income and
product accounts (NIPA).
McGrattan and Prescott (2003), using recent BEA data, estimate an after-tax return to
noncorporate capital of 4 percent over the period 1929–2000; over the period 1941–1946, the average
return for their series is 4.95 percent. They impute a 4 percent return to government capital, which
may be high for the World War II period. They also leave out the corporate sector because of
issues with estimating returns to intangible capital. If we redo their calculation imputing a 0
percent return to government capital and adding in measured corporate income less tax (in the
24numerator) and measured corporate capital (in the denominator), then the average we compute
is 4.5 percent over the period 1941–1946. As McGrattan and Prescott point out, however, this is
an overestimate of the true return because measured corporate income does include part of the
income to intangible capital, while measured corporate capital does not. This puts the estimate of
the average closer to the average of the after-tax marginal product of capital, which is 3.55 percent
for the U.S. data and 3.52 percent for our benchmark model.
Another possible comparison that can be made is the model’s return on capital and the
return on corporate equities. When comparing the marginal product of capital with any equity
return, the main deviation is in the volatility rather than the means. For example, averaging
the inﬂation-adjusted total returns for the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Composite reported in the
Ibbotson Associates (2001) yearbook for the period 1941–1946, we ﬁnd an average of 6.87 percent.
If we adjust for taxes on dividends using McGrattan and Prescott’s (2003) tax rate on dividends
times the S&P income return from Ibbotson Associates, then the average return is 4.1 percent.
This slightly overestimates the actual equity return because of taxes on capital gains; however,
these adjustments are diﬃcult to calculate given the fact that only realized gains are taxed. If we
abstract from taxes on capital gains, the average equity return is only 50 basis points higher than
the model’s predicted return.
McGrattan and Prescott (2003, Figures 3–5) ﬁnd that diﬀerences in average returns on
bonds, stocks, and NIPA capital are not large except in the case of debt returns during the wartime
period that includes World War II and the Korean War. Speciﬁcally, averaging inﬂation-adjusted
total returns reported in the Ibbotson Associates (2001) yearbook for the period 1941–1946, we
ﬁnd corporate bonds earned −3.7 percent, long-term government bonds earned −3.5 percent,
intermediate-term government bonds earned −5.1 percent, and U.S. Treasury bills earned −6.4
percent. These very low numbers for debt returns have been noted in earlier work as puzzling for
neoclassical theory. (See, for example, Mulligan 1998.)
But these returns are not a good measure for the household intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution, which is the relevant object in the model. Federal government debt made up only
about 5 percent of total household assets in 1945. Most federal debt was held by the Federal Reserve
System, commercial banks, insurance companies, pension funds, state and local governments, and
government retirement accounts. Almost all of these institutions were restricted in terms of the
assets they could hold; they typically could not hold equity, and their portfolios were held primarily
in credit market instruments (debt) or cash. For example, life insurance companies, banks, savings
25institutions, pension funds, and state and local government retirement programs held between 50
and 65 percent of their assets in U.S. Treasury securities in 1945, compared to only about 5 percent
of household assets in federal government debt. The literature on ﬁnancial markets discusses the
regulations and restrictions in detail, and their impact on portfolios. We have reproduced some
passages from that literature below.
“There have been several factors inﬂuencing the amount of stocks held by the com-
panies: (1) statutory requirements and limitations, (2) valuation regulations, and (3)
investment policies. With respect to statutory provisions ... the provisions of New York
State law in particular have had an important inﬂuence on the amount of stocks held by
all life insurance companies since companies domiciled in the state have constituted a
large, although varying, segment of the industry. Under the New York law, investment
in preferred stocks was not permitted from 1906 until 1928 and in common stocks from
1906 until 1951. The laws of other states also have not permitted stock investment.
When such investment has been permitted there have been limitations on the amount
of such holdings. These limitations are often expressed as a percentage of assets or sur-
plus and help to account for the relatively small investment in equities by life insurance
companies.” Life Insurance Association of America (1962, p. 51)
“Although commercial banks are the largest single group of ﬁnancial institutions if
measured by size of assets, they have hardly ever been important holders of corporate
stock. This fact is mostly due to regulation. National banks are virtually precluded from
owning corporate stock except that of Federal Reserve banks. While the regulations
are not as strict in many states, they still severely limit the freedom of state-chartered
banks to invest in corporate stocks even if they desire to.” Goldsmith (1973, p. 52 and
Table 2.7)
“In the years immediately following the war [WWII], the interest rates on long-term
government bonds (pegged at 2 1/2 percent) kept interest rates on private bonds at simi-
lar low levels. The higher returns on common stock investments were strong inducement
for bank trustees to invest an increasing share in stocks. Accordingly, uninsured pen-
sion funds quickly sold oﬀ the government securities which they had accumulated during
WWII and invested primarily in corporate stocks and bonds. This change was made
possible by a revision in New York State law allowing trustees to invest up to 35 per-
cent of a fund in stocks.” (p. 230) “Historically, life insurance companies have been very
conservative investors, on the presumption that their fundamental objective should be
safety of principal. As a result over three-fourths of all life insurance assets have been
invested in corporate bonds and mortgages. A variety of statutory and institutional
considerations reduced the investment alternatives in corporate stock that were avail-
able to life insurance companies; state laws provide very strict limitations. Most life
insurance company assets are held by companies licensed in New York. Originally, New
York State law prohibited investment in corporate stock. Relaxation of this restriction
in 1951 allowed life insurance companies to invest up to 3 percent of total assets in com-
mon stock; an amendment in 1957 raised the limit to 5 percent. The law also prescribes
limits on the type of company whose stock is eligible. A company must have paid a div-
idend in each of the previous ten years, and dividends must not have exceeded earnings
in any year. Obviously, these restrictions severely limit the choice of stocks open to life
insurance companies.” (p. 231) “The rules for valuation of assets constitute the second
major deterrent to stock investment by life insurance companies. Most life insurance
companies are mutual companies and are required by law to return proﬁts in excess of
26a stated level of net policy liabilities. Thus, determining asset values critically aﬀects
a company’s cash ﬂow and almost since its beginning has been the subject of dispute
in the industry.” (p. 253) “A trust agreement is an arrangement by which the trustee
assumes ﬁduciary responsibility for managing assets for the beneﬁt of another. The
agreement typically deﬁnes that responsibility, the degree of discretion of the trustee,
and the rules for distributing beneﬁts of the trust. The deﬁnition of ﬁduciary discretion
has many dimensions. Often it limits the extent of corporate stock and other types
of investments; it may impose limits on the share of funds that may be invested in a
single company; and it may lay out guidelines, indicating which companies are eligible.
Also state laws and state courts interpret the nature and limits of trustee discretion
diﬀerently. In some cases the trustee is limited to selecting from a ‘legal list’ of eligible
investments maintained by many states. Within the agreed upon limits of ﬁduciary re-
sponsibility trustees typically are limited by the ‘prudent man’ rule. (Harvard College
vs. Amory 1835).” (Goldsmith, Brady, and Mendershausen 1956, p. 226)
These passages summarize why federal debt was almost exclusively held by these institutions.
Of the very small amount of federal debt that was held by households, roughly two-thirds was held
in savings bonds. These savings bonds had their own set of idiosyncratic attributes: there was no
risk of capital loss, owners were insured against loss or theft, the securities were non-marketable,
acquisition costs were very low (many savings bonds were acquired through payroll deduction), they
were available in small denominations (as low as $25), and interest rates on some of these securities
were higher than on long-term Treasury securities. Savings bonds were primarily accumulated
by relatively low-income households who found the low denominations and low acquisition costs
attractive, and who in fact typically paid no taxes on the income from these securities. Low-income
households at this time had few other investment options because the cost of holding a diversiﬁed
equity portfolio was high, and minimum denominations for other forms of debt were typically much
higher than for savings bonds. (See Board of Governors 1944.) This discussion indicates that
analyzing U.S. debt returns during World War II would require modeling the details of regulations
aﬀecting the bond markets, which is well beyond the scope of this paper.
In summary, we have shown that the model’s predicted wage rate is consistent with standard
measures of U.S. labor productivity and compensation per hour. We have shown that the model’s
predicted return to capital is consistent with a measure of the return to NIPA capital, based on
the marginal product of capital; it is consistent on average with a measure of the return based on
the ratio of capital income to the capital stock and on average with a measure of the return to
corporate equities.
27Notes
1By the neoclassical model, we mean the one-sector optimal growth model and a constant
returns to scale technology with capital and labor as inputs, a standard law of motion for the capi-
tal stock, balanced growth preferences deﬁned over consumption and leisure, a resource constraint
that divides output between consumption, investment, and government spending, and perfect com-
petition in all markets.
2A few studies have used the neoclassical model to address a limited set of questions about
World War II. Braun and McGrattan (1993) use a stochastic model with World War II government
expenditure shocks and focus on whether the model is consistent with pre-tax real wage changes
during the war. However, their analysis omits all other shocks and does not provide a systematic
test of the other variables in the model. Ohanian (1997) uses a perfect foresight neoclassical model
for normative rather than positive purposes. He measures the welfare costs of the diﬀerent war
ﬁnance policies used in World War II and the Korean War. His analysis does not shed light on the
present disagreement about the appropriate theoretical framework for analyzing large ﬁscal shocks.
3Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) analyze data on military expenditures and real wages
from World War II, and also from other years. The World War II observations are likely the most
informative because they are by far the largest expenditure shocks and also the most exogenous
of the increases in military spending. They do not perform an assessment of the model for World
War II.
4Siu (2008) studies the welfare consequences of World War II conscription in a Ramsey
environment in which taxing the household’s time endowment is one component of eﬃcient taxation.
5Most of these R&D expenditures were outside of the Department of Defense. Real defense
spending rose from $30 million in 1930 to $425 million in 1945, which implies that about two-thirds
of these R&D expenditures were outside of defense. We have been unable to ﬁnd measures of
private R&D spending over this period, but it is almost certain that the sum of private and public
R&D spending increased signiﬁcantly during the war. In particular, the total number of scientists
and engineers employed in the manufacturing sector almost doubled between 1940 and 1946. (See
Mowery and Rosenberg 2000.)
6The appendix describes some of the bond market regulations in detail.
7Households held only 5 percent of the federal debt at this time. The appendix discusses these
regulations, summarizes the portfolio composition of households versus regulated intermediaries,
and shows that the great majority of debt was held by these regulation institutions.
8We include the possibility of transfers because it will let us examine how changing the
quantity of debt issued by the government (by allowing a fraction of expenditures to be ﬁnanced
with lump-sum taxes) aﬀects the results.
9Alternatives to this speciﬁcation include one used by Ohanian (1997) in which some families
were hit by the draft and others were not, and Mulligan (1998), who considers only hours and
subtracts draftee hours from the household’s total time endowment. Ohanian preserves the repre-
sentative agent assumption by assuming separable utility between consumption and leisure, and by
assuming that labor income for those in the military and private workers was the same. Mulligan’s
formulation is also a representative agent speciﬁcation, but it does not allow one to distinguish
28between the labor force and hours per worker.
10We do not include foreign net investment with private investment since the labor input in
(6) includes only domestic labor. Instead, we add it with military investment. This choice has little
impact on the results since the current account is relatively small in this period.
11McGrattan and Ohanian (2008) evaluate the sensitivity of the results to changes in the
starting date of the analysis by beginning in 1941 rather than 1939. The results are very close.
12Some readers may be interested in trying to understand the results by decomposing the
impact of the shocks into wealth eﬀects and substitution eﬀects, as in Barro (1981) and Hall
(1980). This is complicated because the shocks are realized over diﬀerent points in time, which
generates sequences of wealth, intratemporal substitution, and intertemporal eﬀects and intra- and
intertemporal substitution eﬀects that are not easy to understand. Our alternative approach of
evaluating the contribution of each shock provides a much easier way of understanding the factors
that are driving these results.
13See the appendix for more details.
14To construct an after-tax wage, Mulligan uses the Barro-Sahasakul (1986) tax rate that
mixes tax rates on labor and capital income. In McGrattan and Ohanian (2008), we rerun our
numerical experiments using this tax rate for τlt and compare it to our benchmark results.
15There are some measurement diﬀerences between our analysis and those of Mulligan (1998)
and Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), though they are not central to our ﬁndings. Our measure
of the price deﬂator excludes military compensation, which is appropriate for our model. Mulligan
deﬂates the wage using the CPI. Rotemberg and Woodford deﬂate World War II wages using the
GNP deﬂator, which includes military compensation. For the manufacturing wage, Mulligan uses
the wage from 25 industries, whereas we use total compensation for all manufacturing. Finally, we
construct an after-tax wage using Joines’ (1981) estimate of the labor tax rate. Mulligan uses the
Barro-Sahasakul (1986) tax rate. Our main results are robust to these measurement diﬀerences.
16All of the wage measures exclude estimates of wages of farm proprietors because, in general,
it is hard to estimate the fraction of proprietor’s income that is labor income and, more speciﬁcally,
because the relative price of farm output nearly doubled during World War II. Accounting for this
enormous relative price change is beyond the scope of our one-sector model. It should be noted
that the wages of farm employees are included in our full-time equivalent wage measure.
17Some authors, including Mulligan (1998) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), have used
average hourly earnings in 25 manufacturing industries as a wage measure for the manufacturing
sector. This series has two drawbacks. One is that it does not include non-wage compensation,
which was signiﬁcant in World War II. Also, it does not cover the entire manufacturing sector.
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32Table 1
Parameter Values for Model Simulations
Preferences ψ = 2.37, ξ = .0, β = .985, ¯ ld = 50/84
Technology θ = .38, δ = .055
Growth γn = .015, γz = .02
Table 2
Nonmilitary Hours During World War IIa
Model Predictions
Government Add Add Add
Spending Technology Military Distortionary U.S.
Year Only Shocks Draft Taxes Data
1939 128 110 111 107 97
1940 130 113 115 109 100
1941 131 122 123 114 106
1942 132 129 127 114 112
1943 131 132 127 111 116
1944 128 132 125 109 113
1945 124 128 122 105 105
Average 129 124 121 110 107
a All series are relative to average U.S. nonmilitary hours for 1946–1960.
33Table 3
After-tax Wages During World War II
Model Predictions U.S. Estimates, Based on
Government Add Add Add NIPA Compensation
Spending Technology Military Distortionary NIPA
Year Only Shocks Draft Taxes Product Civilian Nonfarm Manufacturing
1939 91 96 96 97 101 96 106 111
1940 91 97 97 98 101 96 105 110
1941 89 98 98 100 102 97 102 105
1942 86 98 99 101 101 99 102 104
1943 83 99 100 103 100 101 103 103
1944 82 100 102 103 102 102 104 103
1945 80 100 101 101 102 104 106 103
Average 86 98 99 100 101 99 104 105
a Model series and U.S. labor productivity are relative to average U.S. labor productivity for
1946-1960; U.S. estimates based on NIPA incomes are relative to own averages for 1946-1960
with the exception of manufacturing, which ends in 1957.
3
4Figure 1. U.S. Government Spending, Tax Rates, Draft, and TFP, 1939−1946
Notes:
(1) Government spending series are real and detrended by dividing by the population over 16 and by the growth
trend in technology (scaled so that the 1946 real detrended level of GNP less military compensation equals 1).
(2) Total factor productivity is defined to be Y/(K
θLp
1-θ), where Y is real detrended GNP less military compensation,
K is real detrended nonmilitary capital stock, Lp is nonmilitary hours worked, and θ = .38.





























































35Figure 2. Real Detrended GNP, Private Consumption, and Private Investment, 1939−1946
(Benchmark Deterministic Model)

























Note: Data series are divided by the 1946 real detrended level of GNP less military compensation.
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Note: Hours series are divided by the 1946−1960 U.S. averages.
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Figure 4. After-tax Returns to Capital and Nonmilitary Labor, 1939−1946
(Benchmark Deterministic Model, All Series Constructed Using Marginal Productivities)











Note: Return to capital is equal to 100(1-τk)(θY/K-δ) .
Return to labor is after-tax nonmilitary labor productivity, with hours normalized by the 1946−1960 U.S. average.
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8Figure 5. U.S. Pre-tax Wage Rates and Prediction of Model with Labor Tax Rate
Series Implying Nonmilitary Hours Are Equal in Model and Data, 1939−1946
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